

# REGIONAL MILITARY SECURITY COOPERATION IN NORTH AMERICA

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## ABSTRACT

REGIONAL MILITARY SECURITY COOPERATION IN NORTH AMERICA, by  
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This paper is a concept document for North American regional security cooperation. The concept is a comprehensive, whole-government approach to regional security. It centers on actions the United States has and is taking from diplomatic, information, military, and economic perspective. It also examines where the United States is falling short in the employment of all elements of national power in achieving regional security. I frame the problem in the context of globalization and the predicted geo-political landscape of the future based on recent history.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	3
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN.....	11
CHAPTER 4 SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS .....	14
Section 1: A Changing World.....	14
Section 2 The North American Region.....	30
Section 3 A Regional Strategic Concept.....	44
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION.....	53
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	56
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	58

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

This paper will examine the concept of integrated security cooperation as part of a comprehensive regional strategic concept for North America. A review of current literature will serve as the main research sources. The primary research question is how might the United States better facilitate greater security cooperation militarily between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico? Secondary research questions are why do we need increased security integration? How do current agreements between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico impact security integration? What are some organizational models that might apply to our requirement? Each research question has several associated tertiary questions.

The paper consists of five chapters. Chapters 1 through 3 are introductory and discuss current literature and research design. Analysis and synthesis are contained in chapter 4. Three sections comprise chapter 4. Section one will address why we should consider greater integration and historical precedents that support integration from a global perspective. Section two focuses specifically on North America with an analysis of Canada and Mexico from a political, social, economic, and military perspective and each country's relationship, both historical and present, with the United States. Section three examines current and past regional integration and cooperative efforts of diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power and discusses their successes and shortcomings. By examining these shortcomings in terms of the four instruments of national power, I illustrate how a regional strategic concept using the instruments of national power is a valid method for designing a comprehensive, whole

government approach to achieving regional security and other national objectives as they relate to protecting the homeland. I will discuss future efforts and proposals for shortcomings, specifically from a military security integration perspective.

Chapter 5 will be concluding comments discussing challenges to successful regional security integration and any conditions that may facilitate success.

By conducting this research examining a holistic approach to regional security, I hope to make an adequate argument as to how a regional strategic concept methodology would be advantageous to the North American region. Additionally, why an overarching “whole government” strategy is feasible for North American security and that it should not be limited to just diplomatic or economic cooperation. Ideally, this concept document and supporting literature review will be of use to others and contribute to the greater discussion regarding homeland security.



## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

There are many great works on the global social, political, economic, and security landscape that describe how our world has changed, how it continues to change, and how these changes may influence the United States now and in the future. The works chosen to reference why increased security cooperation and integration are needed are written by Thomas Barnett, George Friedman, Samuel Huntington, and Michael Klare. All are noted subject matter experts in the field. They provide the basis for chapter 4, section one, and are references in follow-on sections.

In Thomas Barnett's *Blueprint for Action*, sequel to his *The Pentagon's New Map*, he elaborates on how the United States may create a global security environment to facilitate positive economic activity and political stability. He discusses how this extends beyond the capabilities of the Department of Defense alone and must include other elements of our national power. This builds upon the first work as a basis of how he sees the global social, political, economic and military landscape with predictions for future points of conflict. He sees the countries of the world in three categories. Those who have developed and become part of globalization (approximately two-thirds of the world), those who have not (the remaining one-third), and those globalized, or globalizing, countries who are on the "seam" between globalized and non-globalized countries. His "blueprint" discusses actions to re-enforce the globalized countries, close the gap with non-globalized countries, and re-enforce the seam countries. Ultimately leading to universal inclusiveness and global peace is the ideal. He argues that the United States

should “equate its national security with the continued survival and success of globalization.”

George Freidman provides predictions and anticipations of the global social, political, economic and military landscape for the next one hundred years in his book, *The Next 100 Years, a Forecast for the 21st Century*. He discusses where, when, with whom, and why future wars and conflict will be fought. He outlines a course for the United States from what he calls the dawning of “an American Age” through another world war to a “Golden Decade” and finally to a struggle for North American influence with Mexico. He also discusses how population, technology, culture will affect these events.

In his work, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington describes how the world has changed from pre-1920 to post-1990. He defines civilizations based on culture, language, and ethnicity more so than by economic interdependence, political system, or military strength. He argues that cultural, ethnic, religious “fault lines,” or those where different cultures come together, are future sources of conflict and alliances. He argues that this new predominate influence has been brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union and collapse of one of two predominate ideologies of the Cold War-Communism. He also proposes that Nation-states and Ideologies are no longer the driving force behind global politics.

In *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, Michael Klare describes how future conflicts are going to arise primarily over access and control of natural resources to include oil, water, natural gas, and minerals. He argues that a vacuum exists due to the ending of the Cold War, the rise of Islamic ideology, and other shifts in

balances of power that are causing a global scramble to secure resources for future use. He also argues that a finite and dwindling supply of these resources is further exacerbating the potential for future conflict.

Chapter 4, section two, begins with a continued discussion of how North America, specifically, has changed as a result of globalization and the end of the Cold War and how the future global geo-political landscape may impact North America. I continue to reference Thomas Barnett, Samuel Huntington, Robert Friedman, and Michael Klare. I then analyze North America's economic and security interconnectedness prior to 11 September 2001 (9-11), the impact of 9-11, and efforts towards cooperation and integration since 9-11. I use several academic and government documents.

*A Congressional Research Service Report (CRS) on Mexico's Importance and Multiple Relationships with the United States.* The CRS Report describes the various ways the United States and Mexico interact in a bilateral relationship as of 2006. It states the fact that the former President George W. Bush referred to the U.S.-Mexico relationship as the most important to the U.S. based on size of border, amount of trade and investment, family and cultural linkages due to immigration and tourism, and environmental and health concerns. It also describes the various ways in which the two countries interact to include provisions outlined in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the trilateral Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. established in 2005.

In *The Rebordering of North America*, Peter Andres and Thomas Biersteker discuss North American integration and exclusion in a "new security context" which comes in the wake of the events on 11 September 2001. They describe the path that North

American integration was on pre-9-11, discuss how 9-11 affected that path, and provide input on how the three countries might continue down the path of integration post-9-11. They describe the associated political, economic, and security issues.

*Building a North American Community* is an Independent Task Force Report sponsored by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations in partnership with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. The Task Force describes and prescribes solutions for policy gaps that have emerged since the inception of NAFTA, events of 9-11 and the current economic and security environment of North America. Specifically, they examine policy changes due to the positive impact of NAFTA on intercontinental trade, and increasingly competitive global market, pockets of underdevelopment within North America, increasing demand on natural resources, and threats to our borders.

*Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An Overview and Selected Issues* is a CRS Report for Congress. This report outlines the basic tenants of the Security and Prosperity Partnership agreement between Canada, Mexico and the United States that was established in 2005 in Waco, Texas. It provides a background discussion on the SPP, describes the working groups established by the SPP, describes the Prosperity components and the Security components of the SPP. It discusses the impact of SPP on member-country economies and the specific issues of transportation corridors, cargo security and border facilitation.

*The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America* by Dr. Jason Ackleson of New Mexico State University and Dr. Justin Kastner of Kansas State University is an examination of the SPP focused on the Canada-U.S. perspective. It was submitted for

consideration in *The American Review of Canadian Studies* in December 2005. It describes the historical backdrop of U.S.-Canada relations forged two centuries ago, describes improvements in border management in the wake of issues caused by the United States initial reactions after 9-11, and continues the discussion of what still needs to be done or ways the SPP can further improve cross-border facilitation. They maintain that trade and security are not competitive at the border, but rather interconnected. They cite Milner's International Political Economy framework for international cooperation and argue that national domestic interests predicate foreign policy decisions.

*SPP and the Way Forward for North American Integration* by Dr. Stephen Blank, Dr. Stephanie Golob, and Dr. Guy Stanley is a Pace University, Lubin School of Business Faculty Working Paper. This paper was presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting in San Diego, California, in March 2006 as part of a panel discussing "Future Relations Between Canada and the United States: Continental Drift or EU-Style Integration?". This paper discusses issues that strained relations between Canada, Mexico and the United States during 2005 to include Ballistic Missile Defense, Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. policy changes regarding passport requirements, and NAFTA issues regarding cattle and softwood lumber. They go on to discuss, that despite the issues listed, the three countries continued on the path toward greater integration with the establishment of the SPP. They conclude greater interdependence is driving the SPP. They also conclude that there are two conflicting lines of operations ongoing with regard to relations with each other. One is the national leaders of the countries who are taking issue with each others actions and policies, thereby continuing or creating rifts in intercontinental relations. The other is the business, bureaucratic, and community

elements at the federal, state, local levels who are continuing to engage each other and find solutions to issues that affect each country. They argue that there must be common objectives, communication, and synchronization of effort – everyone needs to get on the same page. Finally, they take issue with the fact that this is going on “under the radar” of most of the country other than those who are directly involved. They refer to this as “integration-by-stealth.”

*The Future of North American Integration* by Wendy Dobson is a background paper for the Trilateral Commission North American regional meeting in Toronto, November 2002. This document provides information, concepts, strategy points, etc that eventually come to fruition in some fashion in the SPP established in 2005. It discusses a four-pillar strategy to attaining economic security-secure borders that facilitate the mobility of low-risk personnel and cargo while reducing freedom of movement for high-risk personnel and cargo, establish a North American natural resource area, a synchronized plan to achieve greater economic efficiency in North American economies, and a defense partnership for North America.

Information from the web-based sites-*U.S. Department of State* and *Jane's Information Group* provides country-specific data.

The *U.S. Department of State Country Briefings* provide a current snapshot profile of the people, government, and economy for the respective country. It discusses in more detail the history of the government and political conditions. For economic discussion, it breaks down the economy into sectors with a discussion of each. Finally, they conclude with discussion about relations with the U.S. relations, relations with other countries and national security.

*Jane's Information Group* documents present a general overview of each country and a more in-depth discussion of defense, politics, economy, and foreign relations. They also go into more detail regarding vulnerabilities, weaknesses and constraints of each.

Chapter 4, section three, continues the earlier discussion of regional economic and security cooperation and integration in terms of the employment of diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power and discusses their successes and shortcomings. The following document provides reference in addition to previously listed works.

*Negotiating North America: The Security and Prosperity Partnership* by Greg Anderson of the University of Alberta and Christopher Sands of the Hudson Institute is a Hudson Institute White Paper written in September 2007. This paper is a critical review of the SPP and subsequent working group meetings and leader summits since its establishment in 2005. They offer changes to the SPP that may facilitate greater success and address three specific issues they take with the SPP. The three issues are a lack of transparency, exclusion of congress, lack of “buy-in” from industry, community, and other groups who can potentially contribute to SPP success or affected by its implementation.

Chapter 4, section three, also discusses how to improve perceived shortcomings in these previous efforts by focusing specifically on those instruments of national power that are not being fully utilized in regard to North American regional cooperation. Supporting documents include *The Joint Forces Operations and Doctrine Smartbook: Guide to Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Operations, 2nd Revised Edition* by Norman Wade. This is a consolidated reference book summary of U.S. Department of Defense Joint

Publications 1, 3-0, 3-08, 3-13, 3-16, 3-33, 3-60, 4-0, and 5-0. This document is referenced when describing the employment of the military instrument of national power to achieve greater security cooperation. It is also referenced to describe how the military instrument could possibly interact with the other elements of national power. The information from this publication is therefore limited to joint doctrine, multinational operations, security cooperation operations, joint functions, combatant commands and the Unified Command Plan, information operations, and interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental coordination.



## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH DESIGN

This paper is a concept document for North American regional security cooperation. The concept is a comprehensive, whole-government approach to regional security. It centers on actions the United States has and is taking from diplomatic, information, military, and economic perspectives. It also examines where the United States is falling short in the employment of all elements of national power in achieving regional security. The context of globalization and the predicted geo-political landscape of the future based on recent history frame the problem. By geopolitics, I refer to George Friedman's description. He describes geopolitical as a "method of thinking about the world and forecasting what will happen down the road." It applies the economic concept of "the invisible hand" to the actions and activities of nations and other "actors." It is a concept whereby nations pursue short-term goals based on self-interests which leads to predictability and gives rise to the ability to forecast, thereby influence, future actions. Geopolitics makes some assumptions-that the "players" are rational and let reality determine feasible, acceptable, suitable choices; that people organize into units larger than families and have a natural "loyalty their origins" (people and places); and that the character of a nation is somewhat determined by location, hence geography, and the effect that location has on its people and communities.<sup>1</sup>

The development of this research paper is through a review and use of current literature. First, will be a review of current literature regarding the global and North

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<sup>1</sup>George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2009), 10-12.

American geo-political landscape of today, its evolution over time, and a consortium of predictions for the future. Two events frame this discussion-the end of the Cold War as illustrated by the increased number of competing regional and local powers, and the rapid technological development of the 20th Century as illustrated by the impact of globalization in terms of population, natural resources, and connectivity.

Second, an analysis of the North American region from the perspective of how rapid technological development of the 20th Century has shaped, and is shaping, the social, economic, and political environment in terms of population, natural resources, and connectivity. Three periods and events frame the examination of this area-NAFTA and the pre-9-11 environment, the U.S. response to 9-11 and the regional impact and the SPP and the post-9-11 environment.

After the global and regional assessments, I will continue to “drill down” into what a regional strategic concept for North America may consist of in terms of Ends, Ways, and Means. Ends are discussed or reiterated based on the previous global and regional discussions. Ways are discussed and reiterated in terms of recent and current efforts being undertaken by the United States to achieve the stated ends. Means to implement the Ways are discussed in terms of the four instruments of national power-Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic. While the definition of each instrument of national power may seem intuitive, for clarity within this thesis Norman Wade’s *The Joint Forces Operations and Doctrine Smartbook* provide definitions.

Diplomacy involves the promotion of national interests and objectives through ambassadors, country teams, negotiations, treaties, policies, and international forums. Information power involves the utilization of public diplomacy, public affairs,

communications, military information, international forums, the media and other venues to promote national interests and objectives. Military power is use of forces and military technology to conduct military operations such as engagements, security cooperation, deterrence, show of force, and others to achieve national interests and objectives.

Economic power is the use of trade policies, fiscal and monetary policies, embargos, tariffs, foreign direct investment and other economic assistance to achieve national interests and objectives.<sup>2</sup> Shortcomings of recent and current efforts and proposals for improvements or possible recommendations for future efforts will be discussed in detail.

In the Conclusion, I will review the overall necessity to further consider greater regional security cooperation and discuss potential challenges to achieving this end. Additionally, I will discuss conditions that, if achieved, may contribute to success.

The intent of this research paper is to present recent and current efforts by the countries of North America to achieve greater regional security, both economic and physical, in a fragmented or unbalanced way through the lens of a comprehensive, holistic approach. In doing so, gaps or shortfalls will be identified. Once identified, I will present options or discussion to fill the gaps in order to create a comprehensive, holistic, regional strategic concept-one that maximizes efficiencies within our government by utilizing all instruments of national power in mutual support of each other towards the achievement of national interests-and regional interests.

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<sup>2</sup>Norman M. Wade, *The Joint Forces Operations and Doctrine Smartbook*, 2nd Rev ed. (Lakeland, FL: The Lightning Press. 2009), 1-4.

## CHAPTER 4

### SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS

#### Section 1: A Changing World

Two events during the 20th Century, perhaps more than any others, significantly shaped, and will continue to shape, the global geo-political landscape of the 21st Century. One of these two events is the end of the Cold War as illustrated by the increase in competing powers across the globe. The other is the rapid technological development of the 20th Century as illustrated by the impacts of globalization. We will view these events through the lens of four strategic thinkers of today-Thomas Barnett, George Friedman, Samuel Huntington, and Michael Klare. Each brings a unique perspective of the geo-political environment. While they share similarities, they exist within vastly different worldviews.

One of two of the 20th Century's most significant events that shaped, and continues to shape, the geo-political landscape of the 21st Century is the end of the Cold War as illustrated by the increase in competing powers across the globe. According to Samuel Huntington, the Cold War divided the world into three distinct geo-political elements: the West, the Soviet Union, and non-aligned countries.<sup>3</sup> Most political maneuvering and effort by the West and Soviet Union was to bring the non-aligned countries into their respective power base. It was an era of competition between two powers for control and influence over the world.

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<sup>3</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 21.

Since the end of the Cold War, Huntington argues that the world is now engaged in a “clash of civilizations” as countries are redefining their political identity and seeking to ensure their security in the wake of the Soviet Union collapse. Another way of saying “clash of civilizations” is “clash of cultures.” He states this clash is taking place along cultural and ethnic fault lines as opposed to economic or political ideologies.<sup>4</sup> He argues four main points to support this conclusion. The first, modernization is not the same as “Westernization” - that although more countries are becoming modernized, they are not becoming “Westernized.” Second, the West is declining in influence as Asian, Islamic influence is rising. Third, cultural alignment is creating a “civilization-based” world order and that countries of different culture often have difficulty aligning together. Fourth, the West has “universalist pretensions” that bring it into conflict with these other civilizations.<sup>5</sup>

How does Huntington predict that this new world order will affect global politics? Essentially, he believes there will be seven or eight major civilizations-Western, Sinic, Islamic, Orthodox, Latin American, African, Hindu, Buddhist, and Japanese.<sup>6</sup> Points of convergence and divergence between these civilizations will shape interests, drive inter-relations and fuel conflicts. These few civilizations will view the world through a lens of cultural and ethnic values and interests more so than political or economic.<sup>7</sup> The ability of the United States and other countries of the West to maintain global influence and

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 20.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 26-27.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 29.

security will be contingent on the ability to navigate a geo-political environment in a manner that recognizes, accepts, and respects the differences of these non-Western civilizations. Huntington simply puts it “Westerners must accept their civilization as unique, but not universal. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.”<sup>8</sup>

While Samuel Huntington sees seven to eight different civilizations, based on culture and ethnicity, competing for and dividing global power, George Friedman sees the post-Cold War environment as a new “North American Age.” He argues that the European Age has ended and a North American Age has begun-and that the United States will dominate this North American Age for the next one hundred years.<sup>9</sup> His main premise for this argument is the fact that Europe has been the center of the international economic system for the past five hundred years due to two factors-control of the North Atlantic trade route to and from Europe and European predominance prior to World War II. After World War II when the United States squarely established itself a pre-eminent world power and with the emergence of transpacific trade equal to transatlantic trade, whoever controlled both the Atlantic and Pacific trade routes could control the world’s trading system and therefore control the global economy. The United States’ dominant naval power, and the fact that it borders both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, coupled

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 20-21.

<sup>9</sup>Friedman, 13.

with the end of the Cold War, put it in the unique position to do just that. In essence, the United States has replaced Europe as the center of gravity for the rest of the world.<sup>10</sup>

This position in which the United States finds itself does not mean that everyone wants to be a friend of the U.S. Friedman says quite the opposite will likely be the case- the U.S. will be feared and countries will align themselves to contain and control the United States. This will mark one of the two opposing struggles of the early 21st Century. The other will be anticipatory actions by the United States to prevent these coalitions from forming.<sup>11</sup> He illustrates this by viewing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an attempt to raise a coalition of Islamic countries against the United States with the purpose of marginalizing U.S. influence and re-establishing Islam's dominance through the re-emergence of a Caliphate. He goes on to further illustrate the second struggle by viewing the Iraq War as the United States pre-emptive measure to disrupt the Islamic community and set it against itself in order to prevent a coalition against the United States from forming.<sup>12</sup>

After the early 21st Century struggle against an Islamic coalition, Friedman sees potential issues arising with a re-emergent Russia. However, he cites that Russia's internal strife, declining population, and degenerating infrastructure ultimately prevent Russia's restoration as a global power and that the "second Cold War" ends like the first- with Russia's demise.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 46.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 6.

Interestingly, even though an emergent power, Friedman does not view China a potential threat to the United States during the 21st Century. He states three primary reasons-China is a country isolated by mountains, jungle, and Siberia, China has not been a naval power in centuries and does not have the capability to re-establish itself as such in the near or mid-term, China is internally unstable due to the prosperity of the coastal region and poverty of the interior regions. He sees China as country that the U.S. will want to support as backstop against a re-emergent Russia.<sup>14</sup>

Friedman does see Japan, Turkey, Poland, and Mexico rising to significant power during the mid-21st Century. He sees Japan's reliance on importing natural resources and raw materials, predicted labor shortages, and the fact it is the world's second largest economy as the foundation for new assertiveness and potential shift in policy against the United States.<sup>15</sup> An illustration of a possible shift in Japanese-American relations is the election of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan representative in August 2009 elections that ended fifty years of one party rule. The new party has announced it intends to withdraw from a joint mission with the U.S. to refuel warships in the Indian Ocean that are conducting operations in support of Iraq and Afghanistan. They have also expressed a desire to re-negotiate the terms of a base realignment deal moving a U.S. base from Japan to Guam.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 6-7.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>16</sup>Blaine Hardin and John Pomfret, "Wary Japan Redefines Relations with the U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 22 October 2009.



He notes Turkey as an emergent power due to their history of dominating Islamic empires, notably the Ottoman Empire. They are a stable Islamic country amid unstable neighbors in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Arab world in the South. Finally, they are the seventeenth largest economy in the world. As Turkey continues to be an economic and military force in their region, their influence will continue to grow.<sup>17</sup>

Poland emerges due to U.S. assistance as a backstop against Russia's re-emergence. This happens concurrently with a declining Germany that loses influence due to stalling economy and significant drop in population.<sup>18</sup>

Finally, Mexico, currently the fifteenth largest economy in the world, emerges as an assertive and more dominant power late in the century. This is due in part to a predicted immigration boom to the United States and an ever-shrinking European influence. As part of the "North American Age," Friedman predicts that Mexico will be a top ten economy and major competitor for influence in North America against the United States.<sup>19</sup>

Friedman goes on to identify potential hot spots of conflict in the 21st Century based on the discussion of emergent and waning powers. He believes conflict will continue and arise in five regions: the Pacific Basin, Eurasia, Europe, the Islamic world, and North America.<sup>20</sup> He states the sources of conflicts in these regions will be largely due to the struggle over control of natural resources, access to transit routes, economic

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<sup>17</sup>Friedman, 7.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 7-8.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 65-66.

considerations, and regional power and influence. He argues many of these struggles will be regional, but that the United States cannot avoid involvement as it relates to our own national interests and assisting those regional powers who have pro-U.S. policies.

So what does this new post-Cold War global landscape have to do with regional security within North America? Given the analysis and predictions of both Huntington and Friedman, the United States has much to gain by continuing and strengthening economic and security cooperation and integration with its North American neighbors. Both Canada and Mexico also have stakes in a strong, stable, economically prosperous, and secure continent. Although discussed later, we can draw two preliminary conclusions from Huntington and Friedman with regard to greater cooperation and integration. From Huntington's perspective, the U.S. has significant populations of Mexican and European heritage and all three countries are predominately Christian. This fact then supposes that Canada, Mexico, and the United States should naturally migrate towards alignment based on Huntington's premise. Second, if Friedman's analysis of Mexico's future is correct, the U.S. can benefit by solidifying relations with Mexico now in order to prevent future conflict. A solid relationship with a rising, influential Mexico bolsters the security, prosperity, and influence of the North American region against the other competing regions of the world instead of creating vulnerabilities due to internal regional strife for competitors to exploit. While Friedman believes the U.S. exercises a policy of disruption in other regions of the world to prevent competing coalitions from forming, it may be prudent to build a coalition in our own back yard, so to speak, through a strategy of North American regional security and economic integration and cooperation. Additionally, it is not a very far logical leap to posit how a stronger Mexico-Latin American relationship

could give rise to future issues for the United States should we fail to bring Mexico into closer North American alignment. Canada does not necessarily have another option, as its neighbors are Russia to the west, the Arctic and Greenland to the north, and the Atlantic and Europe to the east. It would be significantly more difficult for Canada to align with a competing nation or region.

The second of two most significant 20th Century events that shaped, and continues to shape, the geo-political landscape of the 21st Century is rapid technological development as illustrated by the impact of globalization. For the purposes of discussing globalization, I refer to the conceptual terms of Thomas Barnett.

He defines globalization as “the worldwide integration and increasing flow of trade, capital, ideas, and people.” He goes on to say that until 11 September 2001, most understood globalization an economic concept; however, it now includes a security concept as well.<sup>21</sup>

Connectivity refers to “the enormous changes being brought on by the information revolution, including the emerging financial, technological, and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials).”<sup>22</sup>

Disconnectedness is a condition “which allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community.”<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Blueprint For Action: A Future Worth Creating* (New York, NY: Berkley Books, 2005), Glossary xvi-xvii.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, Glossary xvi.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, Glossary xvi.

Functioning Core is the “parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security demands.” The Functioning Core includes North America, Europe, Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.<sup>24</sup>

The Non-Integrating Gap is “regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy” and do not necessarily adhere to its associated security demands. The Non-Integrating Gap includes the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, and Africa, some of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. Barnett refers to this as globalization’s “ozone hole” where connectivity is thin or does not exist.<sup>25</sup>

Seam States are “the countries that ring the Gap – Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.” Some are already part of the Core; others have potential to join the Core. However, their importance primarily relates to security weakness due to the potential exploitation of the Seams against the Core by terrorists.<sup>26</sup>

The Military-Market Nexus is “the seam between war and peace, or the link between war and the ‘everything else’ that is globalization. The nexus describes the

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., Glossary xvi.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., Glossary xviii.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., Glossary xviii-xix.

underlying reality that the warrior culture of the military both supports and is supported by, the merchant culture of the business world.”<sup>27</sup>

It is also important to note that Barnett’s basic premise is that we must continue to expand globalization beyond the Functioning Core to reduce the Non-integrating Gap. By reducing the Gap and strengthen Seam States, we will further create and expand a stable and secure environment across the globe that facilitates greater economic security and prosperity for everyone.<sup>28</sup> Increasing connectivity and decreasing disconnectedness accomplishes this. Barnett finds it important to point out that connectivity does not equate to concepts such as democracy, pluralism, or secularism.<sup>29</sup> This complements Huntington’s notion that a successful United States of the future does not necessarily entail universalizing or westernizing everyone else towards the U.S. ideal.

Now that I have provided a common vernacular regarding globalization, I will examine the impact of globalization on the world in terms of population, natural resources, and connectivity. Friedman notes population as one of the key driving factors that will influence the next 100 years. Beginning with the period 1750-1950 the population of the world grew from one billion to three billion and then doubled during 1950-2000 from three billion to six billion.<sup>30</sup> However, since 2000, the population growth of the world has significantly declined. Friedman notes that the United Nations anticipates a global population growth of fifty percent during 2000-2050-this is half the

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., Glossary xvii.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 264.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 251.

<sup>30</sup>Friedman, 53.

growth rate of 1950-2000.<sup>31</sup> This reduction in population will be most significant in the Functioning Core. Globalization and the rapid technological development of the 20th century are the primary causes of a slowed population growth. While the advancements in modern medicine of the 19th and early 20th Centuries contributed to population booms by decreasing infant mortality and increasing life expectancy, it has also brought about modern birth control and set the conditions for the population boom to end.<sup>32</sup>

Additionally, women in the Core countries generally have more freedoms, are better educated, and contribute to a work force more so than in the Gap. Birth rates are down in the Core because marriage and childbirth are no longer requirements for survival in modern economies, divorce is no longer financial suicide, pensions replace children as retirement stability, and children become an expense versus income when going to school instead of working as they may have done on farms or in factories years before.<sup>33</sup>

Additionally, technological advances are mitigating requirements for large labor forces with the advancement of robotics, computers, and manufacturing and farming technologies to name a few.<sup>34</sup>

So how does this population slow-down and eventual decline in the Core impact the future geo-political landscape? First, as life expectancy has increased, the aging generation of the population boom will require health care and financial support during their “golden” years when they are no longer part of the work force. This will be an

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 54.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 55-56.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 228.

expense for their respective country, community, and family. Second, as more elderly pass and fewer children are born, there will be an eventual labor shortfall that technology cannot overcome.<sup>35</sup> Labor is becoming another object of competition. I will discuss population as it relates to North America in future sections.

Natural resource availability is the second point from which to view the impact of globalization. According to Barnett, one of the most prominent criticisms of globalization is the negative impact on natural resource consumption. However, he does not share this view. He argues that nations within the Gap and the countries of the former Soviet Union are historically the worst offenders when it comes to squandering and abusing natural resources.<sup>36</sup> Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and an increase in Functioning Core countries, the world has actually gotten better at natural resource management. He also argues that Core countries are not as likely to have conflict over natural resources in the future since they generally follow the rule of law, so to speak, that provides a mechanism to resolved issues peacefully, can develop the technology to gain efficiencies, and have the money to develop alternatives.<sup>37</sup> He notes that most of the countries that may have future natural resource issues are in the Gap. The real question he poses is will these Gap countries develop fast enough to incorporate into the Core in time to mitigate these shortages.<sup>38</sup> Finally, in keeping with his premise, Barnett says that under-development will have more impact on natural resource shortages than development. This is because

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 121.

<sup>36</sup>Barnett, 306.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 307.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 308.

under-developed Gap countries contain most of the world's natural resources that serve as their primary economic base.<sup>39</sup>

Contrary to Barnett, Michael Klare anticipates significant natural resource shortages in the coming years and this shortage will spur future conflicts. He argues that as world economies “grow” and more nations and people become prosperous, the consumption of natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals increases. When coupled with a finite amount of natural resources, the availability and cost of these resources becomes global friction points.<sup>40</sup> By natural resources, we are commonly referring to oil, natural gas, water, and minerals. Of these, oil and water are most significant to Klare. For the purposes of our future discussion to North American regional security, the focus is primarily on oil. He points out that recent estimates tell us that there is an adequate world oil supply to last until approx 2050-2070.<sup>41</sup> However, consumption is ever increasing due to population growth, technology development, and a more prosperous world. This reduces the world oil supply by 30-50 years.<sup>42</sup> He concedes technological developments designed to reduce our dependence on oil and our conscious preservation efforts mitigate this. However, there is ultimately a finite amount of oil in the world that will one day run out.<sup>43</sup> With regard to water, Klare points out that of the available fresh water, half is

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 307-308.

<sup>40</sup>Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York, NY: Owl Books, 2001), 213-214.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 28.



being factored for human consumption at current population rates but, as with oil, increasing population in the Gap, and prosperity will increase the consumption rate – eventually reaching one-hundred percent consumption of available fresh water by the mid-21st century.<sup>44</sup> While he does not present statistics for natural gas or mineral consumption, he notes that their consumption will also increase proportionate to global growth and population increase. One can conclude that natural gas consumption will rise, as technologies evolve to use it as an alternative to traditional oil as an energy source.

Klare states the geo-political environment in which leaders make natural resource decisions, supply and demand, and the geography of oil production and distribution are three primary factors leading to future global conflict related to natural resource shortages.<sup>45</sup> I have discussed how the end of the Cold War, impact of technological developments, and globalization shapes the geo-political environment and future supply and demand. I will now examine the geography of oil production more closely. Klare states this geography is the “most significant fact about oil from a global security perspective.” He points out that the vast majority of oil, upwards of ninety percent, is located in relatively few geographic locations-fourteen countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Venezuela, Russia, Mexico, the U.S., Libya, China, Nicaragua, Norway, and the United Kingdom.<sup>46</sup> Of these, he also points out that two-thirds of the global reserve is located in the first five listed. He sees future oil conflicts occurring in what he calls the “Strategic Triangle”-the Persian Gulf region, the Caspian

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 44.

Basin, and the South China Sea.<sup>47</sup> Additionally, he sees competition and conflict over water arising in the river basins of the Nile, Jordan, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers. This interlinks with oil competition, as it is the same geographic region.<sup>48</sup> Finally, he views Africa as an additional hot spot as there are many available and untapped resources to include oil, minerals, gems, and timber.<sup>49</sup>

Referring back to Barnett's concept of Functioning Core and Non-integrated Gap concepts, we see that the majority of the world's oil and Klare's potential hot-spot regions are in Gap and Seam countries. Although Klare believe there will be significant shortages of natural resources and Barnett does not, he agrees with Barnett in that the way to avoid these future conflicts is to "establish a global system of resource conservation and collaboration."<sup>50</sup> This can be translated into Barnett's model of increasing the connectivity and the Core by shrinking the Gap and decreasing disconnectedness.

The rapid technological development of the 20th Century has given rise to what we now refer to as globalization by creating a significant increase in connectivity, as noted earlier. By Barnett's definition, connectivity is descriptive of the impact that rapid technological development of the 20th Century has had on the 21st Century. This connectivity has allowed the Functioning Core to expand and strengthen Seam States. If we continue the momentum in this area throughout the 21st Century, we will undoubtedly

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 49.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 139-140.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 161.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 226.

shrink the Non-integrating Gap and decrease disconnectedness. One can conclude then, that potential conflicts of the 21st Century will emerge between the Core and the Gap or those forces within the Gap that do not want increased connectivity. Increasing connectivity is much more than utilizing technology to expand globalization. It also involves an increase in openness by a breaking down of trade barriers between nations.<sup>51</sup>

As noted, the rapid technological development of the 20th Century has shaped, and will continue to shape, the geo-political landscape of the 21st Century by continuing to roll the globalization “snowball” down the hill. As much stability, both economic and security, that this increase in connectivity has created within the Core, it comes with new and challenging issues such as how to manage significant shift in population life cycles and mitigate increasing consumption of natural resources. Just as the U.S. has good reason to improve North American regional security and economic cooperation and integration against other civilizations and to posture for Mexico’s potential future emergence as a significant power, it also has good reason to continue globalization and connectivity to create a North American region that can withstand and compete against the rest of the Core in terms of labor force and natural resource requirements of the future. Additionally, Mexico is designated by Barnett as a Seam State. By increasing regional cooperation and integration, the U.S. will strengthen the Core overall as it seeks to reduce the Gap by increasing connectivity and reducing disconnectedness.

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<sup>51</sup>Friedman, 255.

## Section 2 The North American Region

This section is an analysis of the North American region specifically. The purpose is to narrow the focus from a global perspective to the North American geo-political landscape of today, its evolution over time, and a consortium of predictions for the future. I use two events on which to frame this discussion-the end of the Cold War as illustrated by the increased number of competing powers and the rapid technological development of the 20th Century as illustrated by the impact of globalization in terms of population, natural resources, and connectivity. In the analysis of the second event, how rapid technological development of the 20th Century has shaped, and is shaping, the social, economic, and political environment in terms of population, natural resources, and connectivity, I use three periods and events to examine this area-NAFTA and the pre-9-11 environment, the U.S. response to 9-11 and the regional impact, and the SPP in the post-9-11 environment.

Turning back to George Friedman's discussion on population, he notes that by global standards, inhabitants per kilometer (km), the U.S. is significantly under populated at 31/km compared to global average of 49/km, Japan's 338/km, and Germany's 230/km.<sup>52</sup> He posits this under population is a vulnerability in relation to an economy's three components-land, labor, and capital. The U.S. still has room to grow, however, given the anticipated population (labor) shortfall, especially in globalized countries, of the future that were noted earlier, immigration will be a key factor when developing strategies for regional security and economic cooperation and integration. Contrary to the expected population shortfall of the U.S. this century, estimates predict Mexico will

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 17.

maintain a growing and stable population. Friedman notes the United Nations forecast for Mexico in 2050 between 114-139 million; up from 107 million in 2005.<sup>53</sup> This will provide the labor capability to continue developing and growing, which supports predictions that Mexico is a rising influence in the region and across the globe.

It is precisely this population disparity between the United States and Mexico that Friedman argues will lead to a struggle in North America over influence and control. How might this develop? Friedman says that the coming population, or labor, shortfall in the United States will bring about significant changes in immigration policies designed to encourage immigration.<sup>54</sup> As a result, he predicts a large influx of Mexican immigrants to the United States. How will a large influx have the potential to shift the balance of power in North America? Friedman believes that Mexican immigrants assimilate differently than other immigrant populations—they maintain closer ties to their homeland and cultural roots due to geography.<sup>55</sup> Related to this is the location within the United States where the preponderance of Mexican immigrants reside. He calls this the Mexican-Cession—the areas within the United States that previously belonged to Mexico: California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Texas.<sup>56</sup> He states that the influx will drive populations in this region from 25 to 50 percent Mexican in 2000 to 50 to 100 percent Mexican by mid-21st century.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 224.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 83.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 224.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 226.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

Samuel Huntington states, “If demography is destiny, population movements are the motor of history.” He notes that improvements in transportation and communications (i.e. connectivity) have made migration practical, feasible, and desirable-and enabled migrants to maintain contact with families and home countries.<sup>58</sup> Hence, migration becomes a self-sustaining cycle. Huntington supports Friedman’s view with his own analysis. He states, given that immigration trends continue, the United States will become twenty-five percent Hispanic by the mid-21st Century.<sup>59</sup> He cites four primary reasons Mexican immigrants will assimilate differently than other immigrant populations-they cross land and a river as opposed to oceans, they concentrate in the Southwest U.S. (Mexican-Cession ref Friedman), have a higher propensity to retain Mexican identity, they live in a geographic area that once belonged to Mexico.<sup>60</sup>

Both Friedman and Huntington predict this population shift between Mexico and the United States would create an opportunity for Mexico to exert influence in the region. They believe this would have the potential for Mexico to regain the territory it lost in the 19th Century-if not physically, then culturally. One can surmise by shifting the demographic of the region and having a population that is sympathetic, if not more loyal, to the Mexican government’s point of view, the U.S. would experience significant internal political disruption. Huntington cites the struggle over Proposition 187 in California in 1994 as an example.<sup>61</sup> The proposition removed public benefits (health care,

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<sup>58</sup>Huntington, 199.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 204.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 206.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 206.

education, and others) from illegal immigrants and their children--even if born in the U.S.--resulting in thousands of people of Mexican decent rioting across the state in opposition to Proposition 187. Friedman and Huntington predict the Mexican government will seek to exploit this Mexican population within the United States along the Mexican-Cession and increase senses of Mexican nationalism in their efforts to assert Mexican influence in North America.

Friedman also points out other factors that will allow Mexico to rise in global and regional influence. One obvious factor is that Mexico also borders both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans-an earlier noted critical advantage to any country who wants to influence global trade. Second, Mexico has oil. Third, proximity to the United States facilitates trade and economic partnership. Fourth, there are large amounts of money moving back to Mexico from the United States as immigrants support their families in the homeland.<sup>62</sup>

Friedman also argues that, simultaneously with increasing immigration, the United States will put much effort into developing technologies to solve the labor shortage. These technologies will eventually, late in the century, lead to reduced labor requirement and result in raising unemployment-primarily in the Mexican immigrant population. He predicts this new problem set will further exacerbate tense relations between Mexico and the United States by the end of the 21st Century.<sup>63</sup>

Regardless whether or not significant population issues arise between Mexico and the United States to the magnitude Friedman suggests, the U.S. and Mexico are currently, and will remain, culturally linked. As we noted earlier, Huntington's hypothesis is that

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<sup>62</sup>Friedman, 232.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 231.

nations will align along cultural lines. The Mexican and Mexican-American population within the border regions of the United States creates this common cultural relationship between the two countries. Additionally, Mexico is predominately Christian, specifically Catholic, as is the United States.<sup>64</sup> This common religious heritage is another factor in Huntington's argument that countries are aligning along cultural, ethnic, and religious lines. Canada and the United States have a similar cultural relationship. Other than the American Southwest, the predominance of the population in the United States is of European decent as is Canada. Like Mexico and the United States, Canada is predominately Christian.<sup>65</sup>

While anticipated population issues in North America seem, according to Friedman and Huntington, to center around Mexico and the United States, the availability of natural resources in the region is indeed more inclusive of all three countries-Canada, Mexico, and the United States. As noted earlier, Michael Klare lists the United States and Mexico as two of the top fourteen oil-wealthy nations of the world. They rank 9 and 8 respectively with a combined seven percent of global reserves and twelve percent of global production.<sup>66</sup> Canada also has significant amounts of oil, natural gas, timber, minerals and fresh water. Documented since Klare's analysis, Canada has increased its oil reserve by 179 billion barrels; raising it to the number two largest oil-wealthy nation

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<sup>64</sup>Huntington, 44.

<sup>65</sup>Janes Information Group, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Canada*, [http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/subscribe/sentinel/NAMS\\_doc\\_view.jsp?Sent\\_Country=Canada&Prod\\_Name=NAMS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/namsu/canas010.htm@current](http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/subscribe/sentinel/NAMS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Canada&Prod_Name=NAMS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/namsu/canas010.htm@current) (accessed 18 October, 2009).

<sup>66</sup>Klare, 44.



next to Saudi Arabia.<sup>67</sup> One can conclude that there are enough natural resources within the North American continent to make a strong argument towards creating a regional environment with strong economic and physical security in order to posture against other competing regions. Again, it is not a great logical leap to posit the impact on the U.S. if Mexico more closely aligns with Latin America than with North America. Undoubtedly, Canada's oil reserves will also make it attractive to its Western neighbor, Russia; a potential source other than the Caspian Basin should U.S.-Canada relations erode over time. This is also not a great logical leap. The U.S. and Canada have experienced strained relations - one of the most difficult and recent has been in the post-9-11 environment that we will discuss shortly.

To illustrate connectivity between the countries of North America, I will examine economic interconnectedness pre-9-11, the impact of 9-11, and post-9-11 efforts that have developed as a result.

Perhaps the clearest description of North American integration and cooperation pre-9-11 is through the lens of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). One can argue that no other singular effort has produced such positive economic results for all countries involved. NAFTA's implementation in 1994 is an outgrowth of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989.<sup>68</sup> While Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are not a new phenomenon, Ackelson and Kastner point out NAFTA has done a

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<sup>67</sup>United States Department of State, *Background Note-Canada*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm> (accessed 18 October, 2009).

<sup>68</sup>Jason Ackleson and Justin Kastner, *The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America* (Paper presented to the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, December 2006), 6.

very good job of reducing tariffs, promoting synchronized cross-border regulations, and furthered economic integration between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.<sup>69</sup> Since the inception of NAFTA, economic interdependence between the three North American countries has almost tripled. Canada and Mexico are the two largest exporters of oil, natural gas and electricity to the U.S. One-third of U.S. trade, and eighty-percent of Canada and Mexico trade is within NAFTA.<sup>70</sup> NAFTA is cited as an example of how three countries, which are at different stages of development, can grow and prosper under the auspices of unrestricted, mutually supporting free trade.<sup>71</sup>

Blank, Golob, and Stanley argue that the political economy of North America has ceased to consist of three independent national economies that interact but rather has become one interdependent economy with common integrated sectors such as agriculture, production, and manufacturing and distribution industries.<sup>72</sup> They point out that it is not finished goods, as traditional “trade paradigms” might imply, that are traded between the countries, and instead it is parts and components of complex manufacturing and production systems. One can examine the auto, electric, and agriculture industries as further illustration of the impact NAFTA has had on the economic integration (i.e. connectivity) within North America.

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Pedro Asp, John Manley, and William Weld, *Building a North American Community* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, December 2007) 1-2.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

One quarter of over a billion dollars that crosses the U.S.-Canada-Mexico borders daily is from the automotive sector.<sup>73</sup> However, Blank, Golob, and Stanley make a point that we are not selling cars to each other-we are building them together.

Energy, specifically electricity, passes in a similar fashion. While we pointed out earlier that both Canada and Mexico provide the U.S. with energy sources, there are provinces in Canada that import electricity from the U.S. and the U.S. exports electricity to some regions of Mexico. National electrical systems of singular-nation countries do not exist in North America. Electricity is a continentally managed energy source due to deregulation and technological advancements.<sup>74</sup>

Blank, Golob, and Stanley go on to describe how agriculture, particularly beef, is one of the most integrated industries in North America. They note one expert who states “Mexico exports feeder calves to the U.S. and Canada exported fed steers (before BSE-Mad Cow Disease); the U.S. ships feeders to Canada and breeding stock to Mexico and exports beef to Mexico and Eastern Canada while Canadian beef is exported to the western United States.”<sup>75</sup>

Trading between the countries of North America has been going on for over two hundred years. Although the intent of the Navigation Acts and Corn Laws of early British North America was to keep Canada from becoming “Americanized,” the reality is that cross-border trading of livestock, grain, and other agricultural commodities occurred

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<sup>73</sup>Stephen Blank, Guy Stanley, and Stephanie R. Golob, *SPP and the Way Forward for North American Integration* (New York, NY: Pace University, 2006), 2.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*

frequently at the local level.<sup>76</sup> As both countries evolved and Canada formed a federation, this informal, localized trading between individuals grew into trading between communities and industries-NAFTA is the result of a bottom-up integration process.<sup>77</sup> As this bottom-up trading continued to grow, naturally issues began to arise that required arbitration by a third party. This is the point when governments became involved and the formalized process of establishing trade agreements and policies began. Blank, Golob, and Stanley describe it as “NAFTA, and earlier CUSFTA, can be viewed as responses by governments to developments already underway in the North America economy, efforts to bring regulatory frameworks into line with this emerging economic system and to encourage investors to continue to deepen these new arrangements.”<sup>78</sup>

11 September 2001 significantly disrupted North America’s progress toward integration. It was not until some years later that we began to regain this momentum. In immediate response to the events, the United States “closed” its borders-from sea, land, and air.<sup>79</sup> While prudent at the time, it has since been widely analyzed and scrutinized due to the negative impact on the North American economy-to include the United States. Wendy Dobson points out on 9-11 the U.S. shifted its perspective from one focusing on the facilitation of globalization to one of mitigating the impacts of globalization-

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<sup>76</sup>Ackleson and Kastner, 6.

<sup>77</sup>Blank, Stanley, and Golob, 3-4.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>79</sup>Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker, *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context* (New York, NY:Routledge 2003), 115.

specifically the “vulnerability of openness.”<sup>80</sup> This shift in focus stalled the pace of integration set by NAFTA.

Along the U.S.-Canada border, approximately forty thousand commercial shipments and three-hundred thousand people cross daily.<sup>81</sup> In the days immediately following 9-11 and the increased border security measures, the North American land distribution system experienced delays up to fifteen hours. Estimates indicate that the automotive industry lost \$1-1.5 million dollars (Canadian) per hour (x 40k). Ford Motor Company ended up closing facilities in Windsor and Michigan as a result.<sup>82</sup>

The flow of people across the borders, two-way traffic, was also significantly impaired. An example is Laredo, Texas which prior to 9-11 experienced 3.9 million crossings from Mexico into Laredo in September 2000. During September 2001, this had dropped to 2.9 million.<sup>83</sup> This is just one example of how border community economies suffered in the immediate period following 9-11. Pre-9-11 cross-border trade estimates of \$679 million dropped fifteen percent following 9-11 affecting electronic, textile, chemical and automotive parts industries the harshest.<sup>84</sup>

While these are just two examples, one can conclude that the true impact is many times over due to the vast two-thousand mile border with Mexico and over four-thousand

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<sup>80</sup>Wendy Dobson, *The Future of North American Integration: A Background Paper for The Trilateral Commission North American Regional Meeting* (Toronto, Canda: November, 2002), 1.

<sup>81</sup>Andreas and Biersteker, 10.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 11-12.

mile border with Canada. Peter Andreas makes the point that security has become a new type of trade barrier. He cites Stephen Flynn--“the U.S. border security response immediately following the September attacks was the equivalent of the world’s most powerful country imposing a trade embargo on itself.”<sup>85</sup>

Arguably, one of the most significant comprehensive and holistic efforts since 9-11 to bring momentum back to North American regional cooperation and integration is the establishment of the Security and Prosperity Partnership agreement (SPP). The SPP is the product and action plan developed by a trilateral Independent Task Force which was formed as result of a meeting between President George W. Bush (U.S.), President Vicente Fox (Mexico), and Prime Minister Paul Martin (Canada) that occurred in Waco, Texas at the end of March 2005. While the three leaders endorsed it, it is not a signed agreement or treaty--thereby not legally binding.<sup>86</sup> The Task Force plan centers on the common principle expressed by the three leaders--“our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary.” They further describe, “Its boundaries will be defined by a common external tariff and an outer security perimeter within which the movement of people, products, and capital will be legal, orderly, and safe. Its goal will be to guarantee a free, secure, just, and prosperous North America.”<sup>87</sup>

Dr. Ackelson and Dr. Kastner summarize the SPP’s major initiatives. The Security agenda consists of three priorities-protect North America from external threats,

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>86</sup>Jennifer E Lake and M. Angeles Villarreal, *CRS Report for Congress: Security and Prosperity of North America--An Overview and Selected Issues* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 2008), 1.

<sup>87</sup>Asp, Manley, and Weld, 3.

establish common methods and procedures towards infrastructure protection, port security, intelligence sharing, and transnational threats, facilitate movement of low-risk travelers and cargo across borders.<sup>88</sup> The Prosperity agenda includes--facilitate prosperity through regulatory synchronization and industry collaboration, facilitate the cross-border movement of people and cargo to gain efficiencies, enhance quality of life through collaborative policies regarding environment, disease, and food safety management.<sup>89</sup>

The SPP established several trilateral working groups within each initiative track to develop detailed plans to accomplish these tasks co-chaired by the cabinet-level officials within each government. For the United States, the chair of the Security initiatives is the Secretary of Homeland Security and the chair of the Prosperity initiatives is the Secretary of Commerce.<sup>90</sup>

Since the inception of the agreement, leaders of the three countries have held summits annually to review progress and announce priorities for upcoming years. It is also important to note that since 2005, all three countries have changed leadership, yet the SPP has not waned with new administrations. Within the Prosperity agenda, progress has included a signed Framework for Common Principles for Electronic Commerce, liberalization of Rules of Origin, a North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza, Regulatory Cooperation Framework, Intellectual Property Action Strategy, Trilateral Agreement for Cooperation in Energy Science and Technology.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup>Ackleson and Kastner, 3.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>Lake and Villarreal, 2.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

Less progress has been made within the Security agenda. While the agenda is established and there are ten working groups dedicated to facilitating progress, the Congressional Research Service report cited thus far does not indicate any results from subsequent summits. The countries leaders continue to highlight priorities to work towards reduction of duplicate screening for baggage and cargo, develop law enforcement models for seamless border operations, improve law enforcement communication interoperability, and reduce backlog at the border.<sup>92</sup>

Directly related to the next section, there are two critiques of the SPP that I wish to share. The first is by Greg Anderson and Christopher Sands. Their three issues with the SPP center around a lack of transparency; exclusion of congress; lack of “buy-in” from industry, community, and other groups who have the potential to contribute to SPP success or may be impacted by its implementation.<sup>93</sup> They point out ordinary citizens do not have the opportunity to be informed, understand, and participate in this regional integration that has the potential to impact their daily lives. Along the same frame of thought, by keeping the SPP in the Executive Branch, the citizen’s representative in Congress also does not have the opportunity to address issues. By not sharing information and presenting in the context and framework that supports objectives, the Executive Branch is creating a vulnerability that those who do not share their interests can exploit to disrupt progress. The U.S. is not fully employing the information instrument of national power domestically or regionally with regard to regional cooperation and integration.

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<sup>92</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>93</sup>Greg Anderson and Christopher Sands, *Negotiating North America: The Security and Prosperity Partnership* (Santa Barbara, CA: Hudson Institute White Paper, 2007).



The second criticism of the SPP comes from Independent Task Force member Richard Falkenwrath. While supporting the consensus of the SPP and its recommendations overall, he laments that economic recommendations and action plans far out-weigh the security recommendations and action plans.<sup>94</sup> As comprehensive and holistic as the SPP is intended, its security recommendations, as noted, are limited to border operations and law enforcement activities with little progress being made. There is no discussion of a regional operational environment, common operating picture or organizational framework in which to pass information, share intelligence, and respond to threats in a more timely, synchronized, and collaborative manner. The military instrument of power is under-utilized considering the capability it can bring to the table in support of the SPP efforts.

I have presented an analysis of the North American region from the perspective of how rapid technological development of the 20th Century has shaped, and is shaping, the social, economic, and political environment in terms of population, natural resources, and connectivity. I used three periods and events to examine this area-NAFTA and the pre-9-11 environment, the U.S. response to 9-11 and the regional impact, the SPP and the post-9-11 environment. In the next section, I set out to describe a comprehensive, holistic regional strategic concept for greater North American cooperation and integration that encompasses all instruments of national power working together toward achievement of U.S. national interests.

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<sup>94</sup>Asp, Manley, and Weld, 35.

### Section 3 A Regional Strategic Concept

In the development of a regional strategic concept, I will begin with the establishment of our ends. A good expression of the ends for North America is the shared vision expressed by the three leaders of the North American countries reference the SPP as noted in the previous section. Additionally, the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) components further articulate that it is in our national interests to: champion aspirations for human dignity, strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends, work with others to defuse regional conflicts, prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction, ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade, expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power, transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century, engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.<sup>95</sup>

In the discussion throughout this paper, I have described ways in which the U.S. is accomplishing these ends in North America, specifically NAFTA and the SPP. These ways can also be summarized by noting a four-point strategy for a common North American vision by Wendy Dobson-securing borders that facilitate the mobility of low-risk personnel and cargo while reducing freedom of movement for high-risk personnel and cargo, establishing a North American natural resource area, establishing a

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<sup>95</sup>The White House, *United States National Security Strategy, 2006* (Washington, DC: 2006), <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> (accessed 18 October 2009).

synchronized plan to achieve greater economic efficiency in North American economies, and creating a defense partnership for North America.<sup>96</sup>

When employing the instruments of national power as means toward the achievement of objectives as a way to pursue national interests, it is ideal that all the instruments be employed together in order to maximize capabilities and gain efficiencies inherent to each. The degree to which we employ each instrument (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic) will vary dependent on circumstance, objectives, and conditions. Each instrument's capabilities can complement the efforts of the others when used together. However, the Diplomatic instrument of power primarily determines the degree and manner in which we employ the other instruments.<sup>97</sup>

Within the North American region we are fully employing the Diplomatic instrument of power. In addition to NAFTA and the SPP, the U.S. has entered into several bilateral, trilateral, and multinational treaties, alliances, and agreements that involve Canada and Mexico to include: the World Trade Organization, United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Canada), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), North American Aerospace Defence Command (Canada), Organization of American States, and several agreements related to border security, health, and environment.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>Dobson, 3.

<sup>97</sup>Wade, 1-4.

<sup>98</sup>United States Department of State, *Background Note*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm> (accessed 18 October, 2009).

As noted earlier, we are not utilizing the Information instrument of power to its full capability. The primary purpose of the Information instrument and information operations is to shape, influence, and control decisions and decision-making processes.<sup>99</sup> The U.S. engages in strategic communications to do this. Strategic communications is an effort to gain understanding of and interact with critical elements (groups, individuals, organizations, etc) to generate, re-enforce, or sustain conditions that support our interests and objectives. This is done in synchronization with the other instruments of national power and is designed to be complementary and supportive to their efforts.<sup>100</sup>

This is an instrument the U.S. government can employ to advance greater regional cooperation and integration in support of our national interests. Perhaps it would do this in order to ensure the American people understand how interconnected the North American countries already are, why we need to continue integrating and cooperating, reassure audiences (both domestic and regional) that this does not mean a loss of sovereignty, it does equate to the European Union, and set the tone before those who do not support our national interests can influence the environment. As noted earlier, a lack of transparency, non-involvement of Congress, and failure to gain “buy-in” from others is a critique of the SPP.

We are also not utilizing the Military instrument of power to its full capability in the efforts to attain regional cooperation and integration. As noted in a critique of the SPP, efforts to gain regional security integration pale in comparison to efforts towards greater economic integration. It is at this point, that I turn back to Barnett’s component of

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<sup>99</sup>Wade, 6-2.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid.

the geo-political environment he calls the Military-Market Nexus. In today's globalized environment, especially in North America, our economic security and prosperity is dependent on our ability to create a physically secure environment that facilitates the connectivity between the three countries. We have examined how maintaining traditional border security influences our integrated economies in all three countries. As part of a regional strategic concept, it is imperative that we employ this instrument of national power creatively to develop a "safe zone" for unrestricted connectivity between the three countries while protecting and securing the region from external threats.

To create this physically secure regional environment, we should begin with forming an alliance between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. An alliance defined as "a relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members."<sup>101</sup> After forming, we must establish the organizational framework by which the alliance conducts multinational operations. Multinational operations are "operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance."<sup>102</sup> A parallel command structure would perhaps be the best-suited organizational framework. In a parallel command structure, there is no single commander.<sup>103</sup> Each command, in our case Canada, Mexico, and the U.S., maintains operational control of their own forces operating within their respective area of operations. Country borders

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<sup>101</sup>Ibid., 7-1.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 2-7-8.

would delineate the areas of operations within the North American theater of operations.<sup>104</sup>

In conjunction with the parallel command structure, we would also establish a coordination authority. The purpose of the coordination authority is to facilitate communication, coordination, synchronization to achieve unity of effort.<sup>105</sup> This coordination authority could be a Joint Coordination Center (JCC). The U.S. already has Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters that could perhaps fulfill or host the JCC role-U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Established in 2002, NORTHCOM's mission is to "anticipate and conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests."<sup>106</sup> Once the operational environment and the organizational framework are established, we would begin to conduct Security Cooperation operations and participate in Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) efforts.

Security Cooperation operations is a "focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships."<sup>107</sup> Security Cooperation includes, but is not limited to, operational activities, combined exercises, training, education, and security assistance.

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<sup>104</sup>Ibid., 7-6.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., 1-63.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., 1-37.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 7-4.

Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) is important to achieve true cooperation and integration and essential in effective multinational operations that does not overburden the U.S. warfighting capability.<sup>108</sup> Rationalization refers to “any action that increases the effectiveness of partnered forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources.”<sup>109</sup> Standardization is “programs to achieve the closest practical cooperation among partners through efficient use of resources and the reduction of operational, logistic, communications, technical, and procedural obstacles in multinational operations.”<sup>110</sup> Interoperability normally refers to technologies that work together. In this case, it may also apply to doctrine, procedures, communications, and training.<sup>111</sup>

In the effort to create a functioning regional security apparatus, there may be instances where U.S. forces would have to cross operational boundaries into either Canada or Mexico area of operations when that country does not have the capability or becomes overextended. An example may be a response to a chemical, biological, nuclear radiological, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) event or maritime security issue requiring assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard or U.S. Navy. Once assistance is no longer required, U.S. forces would return to the U.S. area of operations. This would be coordinated and executed through the JCC. The U.S. may also be required to provide the preponderance of capability in a certain area, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and

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<sup>108</sup>Ibid., 2-54.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., 7-4.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

Reconnaissance (ISR), until such a time as Mexico and Canada can continue to develop their own capabilities internally. While our Security Cooperation and RSI activities will promote their military development, it will likely take many years.

Additionally, given that law enforcement, internal border security and homeland security is the responsibility of other agencies under the auspice of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); we must discuss how to integrate this regional defense apparatus into a broader security concept. One way to integrate internal and external security operations would be to place NORTHCOM, the JCC, or elements thereof, under the tactical control (TACON) of DHS. This would mean that DHS directs the day-to-day operations as it relates to homeland defense, but does not have administrative or logistical responsibility. This would further synchronize national and regional efforts to create an outer perimeter that facilitates a more open inner perimeter. Interagency liaisons co-located in the JCC may also achieve this intent.

There are already many examples of current activities along these lines that serve as precedence and lend support to these ideas. Canada, for example, jointly participates in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the development of a Canada-U.S. regional land and maritime defense plan<sup>112</sup> and the number of FBI, U.S. Customs and Immigration agents working in Canadian ports has more than tripled since 9-11.<sup>113</sup> Since the creation of the U.S.-Canada Military Cooperation Committee in 1946, there have been over 2,500 agreements to strengthen joint defense.<sup>114</sup> On the same token,

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<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 1-37.

<sup>113</sup>Andreas and Biersteker, 34.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., 26.



there have been many joint U.S.-Mexico agreements related to border security and trade facilitation. Examples are the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership and Border Liaison Mechanisms.<sup>115</sup> We have long been a partner with Mexico in their struggle against drug trafficking by providing ISR capability and information sharing. While the partnership between Canada and the U.S. is deeply rooted, it is critical that we further integrate Mexico into this regional security relationship.

The Economic instrument of power has been widely employed in efforts to integrate and increase cooperation in the North American region-most notably through the initiatives contained in NAFTA and SPP in recent years. Being a capitalist society, our national stability and prosperity is dependent on the continued success of our free-market economy. Our free-market economy, due to globalization, is now dependent on the economies of Canada and Mexico and vice versa. The integration in various sectors and industries has even blurred the distinction between each of the three economies. Regardless if we integrate to the degree of forming a customs union or a common market between the three countries, it is evident that Barnett's assertion that we must equate our national security, in this case regional security, with the continued success of globalization is essential.

As I have demonstrated, we are pursuing our national interests in the North American region without utilizing all instruments of national power effectively. By examining and discussing the employment of each instrument, I have articulated how they can complement each other and work together in pursuit of our national interests.

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<sup>115</sup>Larry K Storrs, *CRS Report for Congress: Mexico's Importance and Multiple Relationships with the United States* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 2006), 11-12.

Undoubtedly, to employ the Information and Military instruments in a more robust fashion will involve an extreme amount of work by the Diplomatic instrument to set the conditions. However, in the end, I believe a comprehensive approach is more efficient and effective overall. I point to lessons we have learned in the last eight years with regard to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan when we have not used all instruments of national power effectively. Because of these lessons, our joint doctrine has become more comprehensive and we are in the process of reviewing strategies to implement these doctrinal changes.<sup>116</sup> We should not have trepidations in applying our doctrine within our own North American region. We have more interests that are common and interconnected with Canada and Mexico than we do with other regions. One could argue that our national survival depends on regional survival.

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<sup>116</sup>Wade, 1-1-3.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

As I have shown, there is evidence to support Barnett's assertion that the United States must equate its national security with economic security and the continuation of globalization. To this end, we must utilize all instruments of national power in support of economic security and prosperity. To slow, stop, or even reverse the progress of globalization will have significant consequences detrimental to our current economy and future should any of the geo-political and associated conflicts predicted by Barnett, Friedman, Huntington, and Klare prove to be correct.

This is not to say there will not be challenges in achieving better regional cooperation and integration. Challenges may include dispelling concerns that we will sacrifice sovereignty and threaten the sovereignty of our neighbors, reassuring Americans this will continue to benefit the U.S. economy versus harm local economies around the nation, convincing this will improve the physical security of the U.S. and our neighbors as opposed to building walls and attempting to police intra-North American borders, overcoming previous historical conflicts and issues with our North American partners. Additionally, both Canada and Mexico have internal issues that may distract focus from further integration and cooperation as well. Both have elements within who challenge each country's sovereignty-Canada with Quebec and the indigenous population issues,<sup>117</sup> and Mexico with potential insurgencies in the disparate Southern region and ongoing war

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<sup>117</sup>Janes Information Group, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, Canada*, [http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/subscribe/sentinel/NAMS\\_doc\\_view.jsp?Sent\\_Country=Canada&Prod\\_Name=NAMS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/namsu/canas010.htm@current](http://www4.janes.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/subscribe/sentinel/NAMS_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Canada&Prod_Name=NAMS&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/namsu/canas010.htm@current) (accessed 18 October, 2009).

with drug cartels.<sup>118</sup> However, there are several reasons not yet mentioned why now may perhaps be an opportune time to renew regional economic and security cooperation and integration efforts. These include common threats of terrorists, drug trafficking, and organized crime,<sup>119</sup> U.S. primacy in the world is something both Canada and Mexico want to leverage in favor of their own interests,<sup>120</sup> both Canada and Mexico have current leadership that is willing and able to improve relations with the U.S.,<sup>121</sup> Mexico's President Calderon is demonstrating significant resolve to fight drug cartels,<sup>122</sup> and finally, the regional and global impact of the U.S. economic recession of 2008-2009 illustrates the necessity.

Regardless if the conditions of Huntington and Friedman come to fruition, the U.S. can ill-afford to reverse integration and begin anew to be self-sufficient in producing all of our goods and services. Even with an adequate labor force, one has to consider whether or not the American industries can afford to bring their production back to the U.S. given it would entail significant increase in operating cost; or would the American worker accept less compensation as labor in Mexico is less expensive? One might look at the American auto-industry turmoil of 2008-2009 as an indicator. In addition, could the American consumer afford to purchase goods and services at an increased price as the

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<sup>118</sup>Friedman, 234-235.

<sup>119</sup>Asp, Manley, and Weld, 2.

<sup>120</sup>Dobson, 1.

<sup>121</sup>United States Department of State, *Background Note*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm> (accessed 18 October, 2009).

<sup>122</sup>*Ibid.*

industry would most likely raise prices in conjunction with increased production cost. We do not have the raw materials to be self-sufficient. Given a shortage of labor and raw materials, and a populace who would not work for less, nor pay more, one can conclude there is no turning back from globalization.

Thomas Barnett notes that America is a country built on a system that intends to be multinational and allows room for expansion of political and economic integration.<sup>123</sup> He notes that the United States started with thirteen colonies that evolved into fifty states through common economic and security necessity but yet retain their own unique cultural state identity. We should not worry that our sovereignty will disappear with greater cooperation and integration with our North American neighbors.

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<sup>123</sup>Barnett, 289.

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